WHO'S WHO IN THE POLITICAL
PARTY SCENE AS OF 2018
COMPILATION AND COMMENTARY
BY LUCY WARNER
SEPTEMBER 30, 2019
SO WHO ARE THESE DEMOCRATS WHO
ARE STILL FOLLOWING BERNIE SANDERS, THE MILLENNIALS? SEE THE PEW REPORT BELOW. IT
MAKES NO PREDICTIONS, BUT RATHER GIVES PERCENTAGES OF THE VOTERS DISSECTED
ACCORDING TO PARTY, RACE, GENDER, AND AGE. SOMETHING I WOULD LIKE TO SEE IS THE
NET WORTH OR INCOME LEVEL OF VOTERS. WHAT IT DOES GIVE WHICH IS A SIMILAR
INDICATOR IS THE VOTING PATTERNS OF THOSE WHO ARE WITH OR WITHOUT COLLEGE
DEGREES, WHICH PREDICTABLY MAKES A CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE. I THINK THIS BASIC
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA MAY TELL MORE ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION THAN THE MANY POLLS,
ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY ARE SO OFTEN HAND-PICKED TO SHOWCASE ONE CANDIDATE OR THE
OTHER. I SAY THAT BECAUSE EVERYBODY AND HER SISTER WILL GO TO THE POLLS IN THE
2020 ELECTION, OR SO I PREDICT.
IT ENCOURAGES ME TO EXPECT
TRUTH FROM PEW, AS I READ THEIR POLICY STATEMENT GIVEN IN THEIR "ABOUT"
SECTION BELOW. FIRST, THEY CALL THEMSELVES A "FACT TANK," AND
STATE THAT THEY "DO NOT TAKE POLICY POSITIONS." SECOND, THEY HAVE
GATHERED THEIR STATISTICS FROM A WHOPPING 10,000 VOTERS. I THINK THAT'S
REFRESHING. IN MOST CASES IF WE WANT TO KNOW THE IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT BIAS OF A
"THINK TANK," WE HAVE TO LOOK TO SEE SPECIFICALLY WHO MAKES UP ITS'
MEMBERSHIP AND BOARD.
ABOUT PEW RESEARCH CENTER Pew Research Center is a
nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and
trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic
research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew
Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts.
WHO ARE THE MILLENIALS?
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-z-begins/
JANUARY 17, 2019
Defining generations: Where Millennials end
and Generation Z begins
For decades, Pew Research Center has been
committed to measuring public attitudes on key issues and documenting
differences in those attitudes across demographic groups. One lens often
employed by researchers at the Center to understand these differences is that
of generation.
Generations provide the opportunity to look
at Americans both by their place in the life cycle – whether a young adult, a
middle-aged parent or a retiree – and by their membership in a cohort of
individuals who were born at a similar time.
As we’ve examined in past
work, generational cohorts give
researchers a tool to analyze changes in
views over time. They can provide a way to understand how different formative experiences (such
as world events and technological, economic and social shifts) interact with
the life-cycle and aging process to shape people’s views of the world. While
younger and older adults may differ in their views at a given moment,
generational cohorts allow researchers to examine how today’s older adults felt
about a given issue when they themselves were young, as well as to describe how
the trajector.y of views might differ across generations.
Pew Research Center has
been studying the Millennial
generation for more
than a decade. But by 2018, it became clear to us that it was time to
determine a cutoff point between Millennials and the next generation. Turning
38 this year, the oldest Millennials are well
into adulthood, and they first entered adulthood before today’s youngest
adults were born.
In order to keep the Millennial generation
analytically meaningful, and to begin looking at what might be unique about the
next cohort, Pew Research Center decided a year ago to use 1996 as the last
birth year for Millennials for our future work. Anyone born between 1981 and 1996 (ages 23 to 38 in 2019) is considered
a Millennial, and anyone born from 1997 onward is part of a new generation.
Since the oldest among this rising generation
are just turning 22 this year, and most are still in their teens or younger, we
hesitated at first to give them a name – Generation Z, the iGeneration and
Homelanders were some early candidates. (In our first
in-depth look at this generation, we used the term “post-Millennials”
as a placeholder.) But over the past year, Gen Z has taken hold in popular
culture and journalism. Sources ranging from Merriam-Webster and Oxford to
the Urban
Dictionary now include this name for the generation that follows
Millennials, and Google Trends data show that “Generation Z” is far outpacing
other names in people’s searches for information. While there is no scientific
process for deciding when a name has stuck, the momentum is clearly behind Gen
Z.
Generational cutoff points aren’t
an exact science. They should be viewed primarily as tools, allowing
for the kinds of analyses detailed above. But
their boundaries are not arbitrary. Generations are often considered by their
span, but again there is no agreed upon formula for how long that span should
be. At 16 years (1981 to 1996), our working definition of Millennials is equivalent in age span
to their preceding generation, Generation
X (born between 1965 and 1980). By this definition, both are shorter than
the span of the Baby Boomers (19
years) – the only generation officially designated by the U.S.
Census Bureau, based on the famous surge in post-WWII births in 1946 and a
significant decline in birthrates after 1964.
Unlike the Boomers, there are no comparably
definitive thresholds by which later generational boundaries are defined. But
for analytical purposes, we believe 1996 is a meaningful cutoff between
Millennials and Gen Z for a number of reasons, including key political,
economic and social factors that define the Millennial generation’s formative
years.
Most Millennials were between the ages of 5
and 20 when the 9/11 terrorist attacks shook the nation, and many were old
enough to comprehend the historical
significance of that moment, while most members of Gen Z have little
or no memory of the event. Millennials also grew up in the shadow of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, which sharpened broader views of the parties and
contributed to the intense political polarization that shapes the current
political environment. And most Millennials were between 12 and 27 during the
2008 election, where the force of the youth vote became part of the political
conversation and helped elect the first black president. Added to that is the
fact that Millennials are the most racially and ethnically diverse adult
generation in the nation’s history. Yet the next generation – Generation Z – is even
more diverse.
Beyond politics, most Millennials came of age
and entered the workforce facing the height of an economic recession. As
is well
documented, many of Millennials’ life choices, future earnings and entrance
to adulthood have been shaped by this recession in a way that may not be the
case for their younger counterparts. The long-term effects of this “slow start”
for Millennials will be a factor in American society for decades.
Technology, in particular the rapid evolution
of how people communicate and interact, is another generation-shaping
consideration. Baby Boomers grew up as television expanded dramatically,
changing their lifestyles and connection to the world in fundamental ways.
Generation X grew up as the computer revolution was taking hold, and
Millennials came of age during the internet explosion.
In this progression, what is unique for
Generation Z is that all of the above have been part of their lives from the
start. The iPhone launched in 2007, when the oldest Gen Zers were 10. By the
time they were in their teens, the primary means by which young Americans
connected with the web was through mobile devices, WiFi and high-bandwidth
cellular service. Social media, constant connectivity and on-demand
entertainment and communication are innovations Millennials adapted to as they
came of age. For those born after 1996, these are largely assumed.
The implications of growing up in an “always
on” technological environment are only now coming into focus. Recent research
has shown dramatic shifts in youth behaviors, attitudes and lifestyles – both
positive and concerning – for those who came of age in this era. What we don’t
know is whether these are lasting generational imprints or characteristics of
adolescence that will become more muted over the course of their adulthood.
Beginning to track this new generation over time will be of significant
importance.
Pew Research Center is not the first to draw
an analytical line between Millennials and the generation to follow them, and
many have offered well-reasoned arguments for drawing that line a few years
earlier or later than where we have. Perhaps, as more data are collected over
the years, a clear, singular delineation will emerge. We remain open to recalibrating
if that occurs. But more than likely the historical, technological, behavioral
and attitudinal data will show more of a continuum across generations than a
threshold. As has been the case in the past, this means that the differences
within generations can be just as great as the differences across generations,
and the youngest and oldest within a commonly defined cohort may feel more in
common with bordering generations than the one to which they are assigned. This
is a reminder that generations themselves are inherently diverse and complex
groups, not simple caricatures.
In the near term, you will see a number of
reports and analyses from the Center that continue to build on our portfolio of
generational research. Today, we issued a
report looking – for the first time – at how members of Generation Z
view some of the key social and political issues facing the nation today and
how their views compare with those of older generations. To be sure, the views
of this generation are not fully formed and could change considerably as they
age and as national and global events intervene. Even so, this early look
provides some compelling clues about how Gen Z will help shape the future
political landscape.
In the coming weeks, we will be releasing
demographic analyses that compare Millennials to previous generations at the
same stage in their life cycle to see if the demographic, economic and
household dynamics of Millennials continue to stand apart from their
predecessors. In addition, we will build on our research on teens’
technology use by exploring the daily lives, aspirations and pressures
today’s 13- to 17-year-olds face as they navigate the teenage years.
Yet, we remain cautious about what can be
projected onto a generation when they remain so young. Donald Trump may be the
first U.S. president most Gen Zers know as they turn 18, and just as the
contrast between George W. Bush and Barack Obama shaped the political debate
for Millennials, the current political environment may have a similar effect on
the attitudes and engagement of Gen Z, though how remains a question. As
important as today’s news may seem, it is more than likely that the
technologies, debates and events that will shape Generation Z are still yet to
be known.
We look forward to spending the next few
years studying this generation as it enters adulthood. All the while, we’ll
keep in mind that generations are a lens through
which to understand societal change, rather than a label with which to oversimplify differences between
groups.
Note: This is an
update of a post that was originally published March 1, 2018, to announce the
Center’s adoption of 1996 as an endpoint to births in the Millennial
generation.
Topics
Michael Dimock is the president of Pew Research Center.
TO SEE THE AGE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN GEN X, GEN Z AND MILLENNIALS, LOOK AT THE PEW ARTICLE ABOVE. ALSO, THE
FOLLOWING PIECE IS FROM MARCH 20, 2018, BUT WITHIN THAT TIME FRAME, I THINK
MOST OF THE INFORMATION WILL BE ACCURATE, OR SO I HOPE AT ANY RATE. I APOLOGIZE
IF IT ISN'T.
MARCH 20, 2018
MARCH
20, 2018
Wide Gender Gap, Growing Educational Divide
in Voters’ Party Identification
College graduates increasingly align with
Democratic Party
- Overview
- Survey Report
- Long-term changes in
partisan composition
- Growing
share of Democrats describe their views as ‘liberal’
- 1.
Trends in party affiliation among demographic groups
- 2.
Changing composition of the electorate and partisan coalitions
- Methodology
- Appendix
A: Religious category definitions
Survey Report
As the 2018 midterm elections approach, women
and especially college graduates have moved toward the Democratic Party. By
contrast, the Republican Party’s advantage in leaned party identification among
white voters without a college degree has never been greater, dating back more
than two decades.
While partisanship among voters usually does
not change much on a yearly basis, some differences have widened over time,
especially by educational attainment, gender and age. And these gaps are even
larger when categories are combined, such as education, race and gender.
A new analysis of party identification, based on more than 10,000 interviews of
registered voters conducted by Pew Research Center in 2017, finds that 37% of registered voters identify as
independents, 33% are Democrats and 26% are Republicans.
Most independents lean
toward one of the major parties; when their partisan leanings are taken
into account, 50% of registered voters
identify as Democrats or lean toward the Democratic Party, while 42% identify
as Republicans or lean toward the GOP. While the overall balance of leaned
party affiliation has not changed much in recent years, this is the first time since 2009 that as many as
half of registered voters have affiliated with or leaned toward the Democratic
Party.
Since 2014, the last midterm election year,
there have been notable changes in party identification among several groups of
voters. And as we noted in our 2016
report on party affiliation, the composition of the Republican and
Democratic electorates are less alike than at any point in the past
quarter-century.
Persistent gender gap. For
decades, women have been more likely than men to identify as Democrats or lean
Democratic. But today, a 56% majority of women identify as Democrats or lean
Democratic, while 37% affiliate with or lean toward the GOP. The share of women
identifying as Democrats or leaning Democratic is up 4 percentage points since
2015 and is at one of its highest points since 1992. Among men, there has been
less recent change: 48% identify with the Republican Party or lean Republican,
while 44% are Democrats or lean Democratic. That is comparable to the balance
of leaned party identification since 2014.
Record share of college graduates align with
Democrats. Voters who have completed college make
up a third of all registered voters. And
a majority of all voters with at least a four-year college degree (58%) now
identify as Democrats or lean Democratic, the highest share dating back to
1992. Just 36% affiliate with the Republican Party or lean toward the GOP. The
much larger group of voters who do not
have a four-year degree is more evenly divided in partisan affiliation. And
voters with no college experience have been moving toward the GOP: 47% identify with or lean toward the
Republican Party, up from 42% in 2014.
Continued racial divisions in partisan
identification. About half of white voters (51%) identify with the GOP or lean Republican, while 43% identify as Democrats or lean
Democratic. These figures are little changed from recent years. By contrast, African American voters
continue to affiliate with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic by an
overwhelming margin (84% Democrat to 8% Republican). Hispanic voters align with
the Democrats by greater than two-to-one (63% to 28%), while Asian American
voters also largely identify as Democrats or lean Democratic (65% Democrat, 27%
Republican).
Larger differences among whites by education. Most
white voters with at least a four-year
college degree (53%) affiliate with the Democratic Party or lean
Democratic; 42% identify as Republicans or lean Republican. As recently as two
years ago, leaned partisan identification among white college graduates was
split (47% Democrat, 47% Republican). Majorities
of white voters with some college experience but who do not have a degree (55%)
and those with no college experience (58%) continue to identify as Republicans
or lean Republican.
Millennials, especially Millennial women,
tilt more Democratic. As noted in our recent report on generations
and politics, Millennial voters are more likely than older generations to
affiliate with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic. Nearly six-in-ten
Millennials (59%) affiliate with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic,
compared with about half of Gen Xers and Boomers (48% each) and 43% of voters
in the Silent Generation. A growing majority of Millennial women (70%)
affiliate with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic; four years ago, 56% of
Millennial women did so. About half of Millennial men (49%) align with the
Democratic Party, little changed in recent years. The gender gap in leaned
party identification among Millennials is wider than among older generations.
The nation’s changing demographics – and
shifting patterns of partisan identification – have had a profound impact on
the makeup of the Democratic and Republican electorates.
Across several dimensions – race and
ethnicity, education and religious affiliation – the profile of Democratic and
Democratic-leaning registered voters has changed a great deal over the past two
decades. The composition of Republican and Republican-leaning voters has shown
less change.
While a majority of voters (69%) are white
non-Hispanics, nonwhite voters now make up an increasing share of all voters:
29% of registered voters are African American, Hispanic or Asian American or
belong to another race, up from 16% in 1997. Nonwhites constitute nearly
four-in-ten Democratic voters (39%), compared with 24% two decades ago. The GOP
coalition also has become more racially and ethnically diverse, but nonwhites
make up only 14% of Republican voters, up from 8% in 1997.
The educational makeup of the two parties’
electorates also has changed substantially over the past two decades. When
race and education
are taken into account, white voters who do to not have a college degree make
up a diminished share of Democratic registered voters. White voters who do not
have a four-year degree now constitute just a third of Democratic voters, down
from 56% two decades ago. By contrast, non-college white voters continue to
make up a majority of Republican and Republican-leaning registered voters (59%
now, 66% in 1997).
The share of Democratic voters describing
their political views as liberal has increased steadily since 2000.
Republicans’ ideological views have changed little over past decade, but the
share of Republicans identifying as conservatives rose between 2000 and 2008.
Currently, nearly half of Democratic and
Democratic-leaning registered voters (46%) say they are liberal, while 37%
identify as moderates and 15% say they are conservatives. A decade ago, more
Democrats described their views as moderate (44%) than liberal (28%), while 23%
said they were conservative.
Conservatives have long constituted the
majority among Republican and Republican-leaning registered voters. Roughly
two-thirds of Republicans (68%) characterize their views as conservative, while
27% are moderates and 4% are liberals. While there has been little change in
Republicans’ self-described ideology in recent years, the share calling
themselves conservatives rose from 58% in 2000 to 65% eight years later.
Pagination
2. Changing composition of the electorate and
partisan coalitions
The demographic profile of voters has changed
markedly in recent years, reflecting broader changes in the nation. The
electorate is more racially and ethnically diverse than in the past. Voters
also are older and better educated than they were two decades ago.
Overall, while non-Hispanic whites remain the
largest share of registered voters (69%), their share is down from 83% in 1997.
African Americans make up 11% of voters, a share that has changed little since
then.
Hispanics constitute a much larger share of
registered voters today (10%) than in the late 1990s (4% in 1997), though there
has been relatively little change over the past decade. Asian Americans, who
made up a tiny share of voters 20 years ago, now constitute 2% of voters. And voters
who describe their race as “other” also make up a larger share of the
electorate than in the past (5% today).
The overall growth in the racial and ethnic
diversity of voters has changed the composition of both the Republican and
Democratic parties. Yet the pace of change has been more pronounced among
Democrats and Democratic leaners.
White registered voters make up a declining
share of the Democratic Party. In 1997, 75% of Democratic and
Democratic-leaning registered voters were white; that has dropped to a smaller
majority today (59%). Nonwhite voters now make up about four-in-ten Democratic
voters (39%), up from 24% in 1997.
Republican and Republican-leaning voters
continue to be overwhelmingly white: 83% of Republican registered voters are
white non-Hispanics, compared with 92% in 1997. The share of Republicans who
are nonwhite increased from 8% to 14% over this period.
The electorate continues to grow older,
impacting the age composition of Democratic and Republican voters. In 1997, the
median age of all registered voters was 45; today the median age has risen to
50.
Nearly six-in-ten Republican and
Republican-leaning voters (57%) are ages 50 and older, compared with 42% who
are under 50. Among Democratic voters, a larger share are younger than 50 (53%)
than 50 and older (46%).
Twenty years ago, the age profiles of the two
parties were much more similar. At that time, comparable majorities of both
parties’ voters were younger than 50 (61% of Republicans, 57% of Democrats).
In 1997, the median age of Republican voters
was 43, while the median age of Democratic voters was 46. Today, the median age
of Republican voters has increased nine years, to age 52, while the median age
of Democratic voters has edged up to 48.
Over the past 20 years, the American
electorate has become better educated, with the share of college graduates
rising. In 1997, 45% of all registered voters had no college experience; today
that share has fallen to 33%.
And while those with no college experience
was the largest category of voters two decades ago, today the electorate is
evenly divided – a third each are college graduates, have some college
experience but no degree and have no more than a high school diploma.
Despite these shifts, Republican and
Republican-leaning voters are no more likely to be college graduates than was
the case two decades ago. And college graduates make up a smaller share of GOP
voters than they did a decade ago.
Today, 28% of Republican voters have at least
a four-year college degree; 35% have some college experience but no degree; and
37% have no college experience.
The educational composition of GOP voters is
similar to what it was in 1997. At that time, 28% were at least college graduates;
32% had some college experience; and 40% had no more than a high school
education. And in 2007, college graduates made up a greater share of Republican
voters than is currently the case (35% of all GOP voters then, 28% now).
The educational makeup of Democratic voters
has changed substantially over the past 20 years. Today, about four-in-ten
Democrats (39%) have at least a college degree, up from 24% in 1997. And while
voters with no more than a high school education constituted the largest share
of Democratic voters 20 years ago, today college graduates make up the largest
share.
Whites without a college degree remain the
largest share of all registered voters, but their numbers have been on the
decline due to growing diversity and rising levels of education in the
population. In 1997, a majority of all registered voters (61%) were whites
without a college degree. Over the past 20 years, that share has fallen to 44%.
The share of whites with at least a college
degree has edged up from 22% of registered voters in 1997 to 25% today. Among
nonwhites, the share with a college degree or more education has more than
doubled, from just 3% in 1997 to 8% in 2017. And nonwhites without a college
degree make up a much larger proportion of the electorate today (21%) than 20
years ago (13%).
Combining race and education, Democratic
voters are very different today than they were 20 years ago. Today, non-college
whites make up a third of all Democratic voters; they constituted a majority of
Democrats (56%) in 1997. Since then, the share of white Democrats with at least
a four-year degree has increased from 19% to 26%, and the share of nonwhite
Democratic college graduates has more than doubled (from 5% to 12%).
Whites who do not have a four-year college
degree continue to make up a majority of Republican voters, though a smaller
majority than 20 years ago (59% now, 66% then). Whites with at least a
four-year degree constitute about a quarter of Republican voters (24%), little
changed from 1997 (26%).
CORRECTION (Jan.
2, 2019): In the chart “Growing share of
voters, especially Democrats, are previously unaffiliated,” the percentages
of registered voters who are “other Christian” and “all others” have been
updated to correct a data tabulation error.
The
nation’s religious landscape has undergone major changes in recent
years, with the share of the population who identify as Christian declining as
the number of adults who do not identify with a religion has grown.
Religiously unaffiliated voters, who made up
just 8% of the electorate two decades ago, now constitute about a quarter (24%)
of all registered voters. Over this period, there have been declines in the
shares of white mainline Protestants, white evangelical Protestants and white
Catholics.
Religiously unaffiliated voters now account
for a third of Democratic voters, up from just 9% in 1997. In fact, they make
up a larger proportion of Democrats than do white Protestants (33% vs. 18%). In
1997, 40% of Democratic voters identified as white Protestants (evangelical or
mainline), while just 9% were religiously unaffiliated. And white Catholics,
who made up about one-in-five Democrats then (22%), account for only 10% of
Democrats now.
Republicans continue to be mostly made up of
white Christians: A third of Republican voters are white evangelical
Protestants, which is little changed from 1997 (34%); 17% are white mainline
Protestants (28% in 1997); and 17% are white Catholics (20% then).
While religiously unaffiliated voters
constitute a much smaller segment of Republican than Democratic voters, the
share of Republicans who do not identify with a religious denomination has
risen. Currently, 13% of Republicans do not identify with a religion, up from
5% two decades ago.
Copyright 2019 Pew Research Center
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